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Key points 
European countries are not only hollowing out their militaries with insufficient defence 
spending, but are also failing to spend their existing budgets wisely, according to Ivo 
Daalder, former US Ambassador to NATO.1 As a result, EU countries may not be able to 
meet impending security challenges.  
A key issue in this regard is the duplication of platforms (i.e. vehicles bearing weapons) and 
systems in the land, air and sea domains. The analysis shows duplication of a ratio of 3 to 1 
in European programmes/platforms, compared with the US.  
Recent efforts to overcome duplication have so far been unsuccessful. The European Council 
of December 2013, which will be devoted to issues of security and defence, should therefore: 
•  provide clear guidelines to inscribe the future consolidation of the naval industry 
within a strategic framework to avoid the loss of key technologies and know-how and 
allow the development of necessary capabilities; 
•  stimulate the full exploitation of the many pooling and sharing opportunities in the 
sector, both existing and potential; 
•  encourage the use of existing institutional instruments such as the Structural Funds to 
minimise the social impact of the consolidation process. 
 
                                                      
1 Ivo Daalder’s last speech as US Ambassador to NATO, Carnegie Europe, 17 June 2013 
(http://nato.usmission.gov/sp-06172013.html).  2 | VALERIO BRIANI 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper presents the result of a quantitative 
analysis of the number of platforms and systems 
currently in use and in production in Europe,2 
with the goal of providing a precise assessment 
of the current level of duplication. Key segments 
of the land, air and sea domains are taken into 
account. The results are compared with the 
corresponding data from the US, which are used 
as terms of reference. As a federal state, the US 
can in fact be considered as a paradigm and 
example of what could be achieved by Europe in 
terms of a rationalisation of defence equipment 
production. 
The military planning of European forces today 
is still largely a national exercise, and most 
European countries are keen to protect, even 
insulate, their own military industrial bases by 
implementing formal or informal ‘buy national’ 
procurement policies. The resulting duplication 
of capabilities and of platforms and systems is a 
long-standing obstacle to the deepening and 
rationalisation of defence cooperation.  
Back in 1995, Pierre De Vestel showed that 
Europeans were producing a number of 
platforms three times higher than the 
corresponding US programs,3 and warned that 
the economic costs of such duplication were soon 
to become unsustainable. At the turn of the 
century, duplication of platforms was the norm, 
with joint efforts being the exception. Almost 20 
years after De Vestel’s warning, how has the 
situation changed? 
The research shows mixed levels of duplication 
between the three domains of land, sea and air. 
In particular, there is an extremely high level of 
duplication in the land and naval sectors, which 
in the latter case has resulted in market 
                                                      
2 The quantitative analysis was performed in the 
framework of a broader research project carried out by 
the author with the Centro Studi sul Federalismo of 
Turin. The full report, I costi della non-Europa della difesa, 
CSF, April 2013, (http://www.csfederalismo.it/images/ 
pdf/csf-iai_noneuropadifesa_aprile2013.pdf) is currently 
being translated into English.  
3 P .  D e  V e s t e l ,  Defence markets and industries in Europe: 
time for political decisions? EU ISS Chaillot papers No. 21, 
November 1995. 
saturation. Accordingly, the findings generally 
reinforce the consensus towards rationalising the 
demand side of the EU defence market through 
pooling and sharing agreements. At the same 
time, findings suggest that low R&D and 
production costs typical of the land sector would 
hinder effective pooling and sharing, whereas in 
the naval sector rationalisation is more likely to 
occur.  
2.  Why duplication matters 
The number of platforms and systems currently 
in production is significant because it gives a 
rough indication of the number of production 
lines currently open – all producing a similar 
piece of equipment in that specific sector. In 
order to simplify the discussion, ‘production 
line’ is used here to indicate the entire industrial 
infrastructure involved in the production of a 
single platform or system. An unmotivated 
multiplication of production lines is a source of 
economic loss for Europe as a whole, both 
strategically and from an industrial point of 
view.  
Different lines imply that development activities 
are unnecessarily fragmented. Each platform or 
system therefore receives only a fraction of the 
R&D funds that a common effort could have 
provided, which has an obvious impact on its 
technological content. Each country pays a 
higher amount of R&D funds than it could have 
paid for a shared project, which leaves it with 
less money to develop necessary capabilities in 
other areas. Moreover, having different 
production lines also implies a diminished 
industrial output, which in turn means smaller 
economies of scale and a much slower rate of 
production learning; a direct function of the 
output. Unit production costs, therefore, 
increase. The final result of the multiplication of 
production lines is that European countries 
become less technologically advanced; more 
expensive platforms and systems obtain a 
narrower range of military capabilities in a less 
productive and innovative industry.  
The total number of platforms currently in use in 
European armed forces, even if not still in 
production, is also relevant from the budgetary 
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4.  Towards a less fragmented market? 
The figures above show the effect of 
uncoordinated European defence and industrial 
policies over the last 20 years. To paraphrase Bill 
Clinton’s foreign relations mantra: “national 
when possible, multinational when necessary”.  
The data clearly show that an acceptable level of 
platforms duplication has only been reached in 
some selected segments: either where R&D and 
maintenance costs are so high as to be financially 
unfeasible for a single nation to bear, or where 
European industry is still not competitive 
compared to import products. Accordingly, 
equality with the US in terms of production lines 
is reached only in the fighter/ground attack 
plane segment, although even here the number 
of platforms in use in Europe is twice that of the 
US - not counting imported types. This is also 
true of market segments traditionally dominated 
by US producers, such as the air-to-air missile 
segments.  
In the land and sea domains the amount of 
duplication compared to the United States is 
staggering. European forces field as many as 15 
different kinds of infantry vehicles, 11 of which 
are still in production; 7 models of heavy self-
propelled howitzers, 4 of which are still being 
produced; and 16 classes of frigates, only 2 of 
which are still in production. Furthermore, these 
figures are incomplete as they do not take into 
account intervening factors, for instance the 
substantial dissimilarity between national 
versions of multinationally-developed 
supposedly ‘common’ platforms, such as the 
Italian-French FREMM frigates.  
What the data clearly show, in other words, is 
that cooperation in Europe is still driven strictly 
by economic necessity and not by political goals. 
Developing costs for an armoured personnel 
carrier runs into millions of euro: developing 
naval vessels costs dozens of millions: fighter jet 
development costs runs into billions. Therefore, 
relatively cheap items such as personnel carriers 
are developed nationally throughout Europe: 
expensive platforms such as fighter jets are 
developed mostly on a multinational basis. 
While there has been a considerable political 
drive towards rationalising and consolidating 
defence demand, the raw numbers tell us that 
this drive hasn’t yet translated into a major factor 
shaping procurement decisions. Political 
considerations on the effectiveness of European 
armed forces or on the efficiency of European 
and national defence spending are still secondary 
compared to the support of national industrial 
bases. This is understandable, given the major 
repercussions that rationalisation would have on 
a strategic and research-intensive industry. 
Moreover, closing down factories would damage 
on occupational levels, especially in a moment of 
economic crisis. However, how sustainable this 
approach really is should be questioned.  
The number of open lines of production may be a 
significant indicator of the future sustainability 
of the ‘national first’ approach. The very low 
number of open lines in segments characterised 
by high duplications could be considered a sign 
either of market saturation or of the inability of 
national budgets to provide funds for that area. 
From the industry point of view, the two options 
are equally negative as they both imply that 
there is no market for their products. This is 
more clearly observable in the sea domain: 16 
different classes of frigates are deployed by 
European navies, but only 2 classes are still in 
production. Similarly, only 2 of the 10 classes of 
diesel-electric subs are still being produced. On 
the contrary, the land sector still seems to be able 
to absorb national production: 11 lines are still 
open in the AFV/APC segment, and also a 
counterintuitively high number of 4 lines of 
different 155mm self-propelled howitzers.  
As a result, the next industrial sector to 
experience a massive restructuring will most 
likely be the naval industry. This is confirmed by 
the precarious financial situation of large 
shipbuilders such as Fincantieri in Italy or 
Navantia in Spain. Moreover, the defence naval 
sector is highly dependent on defence-related 
sales, with Fincantieri being the only major 
player with a significant share of civilian sales,6 
which makes the industry even more vulnerable 
in the current budgetary environment. While 
R&D, operational and maintenance costs seem to 
be still bearable in the land sector, shipbuilding 
                                                      
6 Cf. V. Briani, A. Marrone, C. Moelling and T. Valasek, 
The development of a European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base, European Parliament, forthcoming 2013.  6 | VALERIO BRIANI 
 
may have become too expensive. Less 
competitive or less supported shipyards could be 
forced to cease activity, and industrial 
capabilities in this sector could be lost.  
The EU could leave this process to unfold freely, 
driven only by market forces and, more 
probably, by the uncoordinated choices of 
national governments that are often major 
stakeholders in the industry. This ‘do-nothing’ 
approach could prove to be a big mistake. In fact, 
it is likely that the restructuring will result in the 
loss of important niche capabilities at EU level, 
with each country being keen to save what it 
perceives to be crucial assets, regardless of the 
European industrial landscape and of what 
capabilities need to be maintained at the EU 
level. 
The EU should therefore be resolute and able to 
inscribe the restructuring of the European naval 
industry into a strategic framework, turning the 
current crisis into an opportunity to rationalise 
and consolidate the sector. The reduction of 
current industrial overcapacity in some segments 
would allow the industry to retain key 
capabilities while allocating funds to develop 
future capabilities, thereby consolidating both 
the sector and European security. In this regard, 
the EDA is currently performing three studies 
that could be the basis of a capability-driven 
consolidation of the EU naval sector. They 
provide, respectively, an assessment of current 
and future maritime operations; a vision of the 
most important naval technological issues to 
address in the following 10-15 years; and, finally 
an examination of the capacity of the European 
industry to support European naval capability 
requirements.  
Secondly, EU member states (MS) should fully 
exploit the pooling and sharing potential in the 
naval sector, which is high. Countries with a 
significant naval industry such as France, Italy, 
Spain and the UK should be involved, as well as 
other MS planning to renew their fleets. 
Generally speaking, EU fleets are in fact ageing 
and there is a need for the development of new 
projects both in low and high capability 
segments, despite the dire financial situation. 
Considering the existing needs and tightening 
defence budgets, the high-end segment of the 
market would be an ideal area for R&T and R&D 
cooperation, while other pooling and sharing 
arrangements could be devised for better 
management of current assets and of future low-
end products. EDA is already active in this field 
with a specific Strategic Research Agenda on 
“Naval Systems & their Environment”. 
Fragmentation from the demand side of the 
market also means that there is a lot of work to 
be done to set common priorities, harmonise 
requirements, and on standardisation, etc. These 
areas should be addressed as well.  
Finally, the European Council in December 
s h o u l d  b e  p r e p a r e d  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  
consequences of defence industrial restructuring 
in times of crisis. This would be in the interest of 
all countries that own a significant naval 
industrial base, including in the civilian sector, 
and could therefore be a point of wide 
convergence. Specifically, the Council should 
address the implications of the social ills caused 
by major dismissals of workers, as well as the 
loss of precious skills and know-how. This could 
be done by exploiting synergies between existing 
strategies, policies and instruments. Useful tools, 
in this sense, would be the Structural Funds and 
the “LeaderSHIP 2020” strategy,7 presented in 
February 2013 by the European Commission. The 
strategy aims to sustain the future of 
shipbuilding through actions in the fields of 
employment and skills, market access and 
conditions, access to finance and R&D and 
innovation. A synergetic use of these tools 
should be clearly advocated by the Council. 
Effectively addressing the issue of duplication 
will require a considerable amount of political 
will and, more importantly, a far-sighted vision 
of the way to go. Difficult choices will have to be 
made, and EU MS will have to invest in a 
complex exercise of coordination of defence and 
industrial policies and planning. However, the 
efficient management of EU defence budgets and 
the maintenance of a viable industrial base 
d e m a n d  s u c h  e f f o r t s .  A s  u n d e r l i n e d  b y  
Ambassador Daalder, what is at stake is the EU’s 
ability to guarantee its own security. 
                                                      
7 Available from: (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
sectors/maritime/files/shipbuilding/leadership2020-
final-report_en.pdf).  